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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 08/07/2011

Accident number: 727

Accident time: 10:15

Accident Date: 19/01/2009

Where it occurred: AF/0718/08510,
MF017, Nargaci
Village, Chamkani
District, Paktiya
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 18/02/2009

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 08/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
use of pick (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
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Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

File date: 18th Feb 2009
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT - 05 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Gardiz to investigate the de-mining accident
involving [the Victim] the De-miner from [Demining group] DT-05. The accident occurred at
10:15 hours on 19 January 2008 [sic] at minefield number AF/0718/08510/MF017, located in
Nargaci village, Chamkani district of Paktiya province.
SUMMARY:
Minefield # AF/0718/08510/MF017 is an anti-personnel contaminated area comprised of a
mine belts located on Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The area was mined by Russian backed
government to protect the Chamkani district HQ of Paktya province from the attacks of their
opposition (Mujahedeen). This minefield is located on the south side around 600m away from
Chamkani district HQ, and in a close vicinity i.e. around 300m to the village.
During the period of operations [Demining group] DT-05 cleared 19670m2 area and
found/destroyed 32 AP mines and 10 SAA of ERW.
On 19 January 2009 at 10:15 10 hours while [the Victim] was busy in excavating a detected
signal, the explosion occurred due to PMN mine and caused the accident. Unfortunately as
he was not fully dressed with PPE, therefore, he has got severe injuries on his face and lost
his both eyes and some minor injuries on his hand and leg. According to the investigation
report, it seems that he was working with pick instead of standard excavation tool and started
excavation directly from the centre of the signal.
CONCLUSIONS:
Poor supervision, carelessness of de-miner and use of wrong tools were contributing factors
to this accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

The command group should strictly control the team members to work in accordance
with set procedures and use standard tools during prodding and excavation.

•

Full PPE must be worn correctly during operations on a hazard area. There is no
exception to the involved personnel.

•

The de-miner should pinpoint the signal properly, mark the point with care and
attention and then start excavation according to the procedure.

•

The team should undergo refresher training with focus on prodding and excavation
drill and team supervision.
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•

This is the second accident of the same team with the scenarios in the similar
minefield; therefore, it is highly recommended that the internal QA to be strengthened
and also frequent external QA visits to be conducted on the teams working there.

•

[Demining group] management is to take appropriate action to improve the command
and control ability of the team command group.

Victim Report
Victim number: 919

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Hand; minor Leg; severe Face
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eyes both
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "severe injuries on his face and lost his
both eyes and some minor injuries on his hand and leg".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that the Victim was working with the wrong tool and without wearing PPE
and his errors were not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control
Inadequacy because the investigators found that there was not enough internal QA and that
the management need to improve the “command and control ability of the team command
group”.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.
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